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Local randomisation is a preprocessing procedure in which one of the legitimate parties of a
quantum key distribution (QKD) scheme adds noise to their version of the key and was found
by Kraus et al. [Phys. Rev. Lett. 95, 080501 (2005)] to improve the security of certain QKD
protocols. In this article, the improvement yielded by local randomisation is derived for an imperfect
implementation of the BB84 QKD protocol, in which the source emits four given but arbitrary pure
states and the detector performs arbitrarily-aligned measurements. Specifically, this is achieved
by modifying an approach to analysing the security of imperfect variants of the BB84 protocol
against collective attacks, introduced in [Phys. Rev. A 88, 012331 (2013)], to include the additional
preprocessing step. The previously known improvement to the threshold channel noise, from 11%
to 12.41%, is recovered in the special case of an ideal BB84 implementation and becomes more
pronounced in the case of a nonideal source. Finally, the bound derived for the asymptotic key
rate, both with and without local randomisation, is shown to be tight with the particular source
characterisation used. This is demonstrated by the explicit construction of a family of source states
and optimal attacks for which the key-rate bound is attained with equality.
I. INTRODUCTION
Quantum key distribution (QKD) [1] was proposed
three decades ago as a potentially feasible way to gen-
erate and distribute cryptographic keys in a secure man-
ner, based on limitations inherent to quantum physics.
The possibility of secure QKD intuitively follows from
the monogamy of entanglement of quantum states or the
impossibility of perfect state cloning [2, 3], depending on
the implementation.
The main theoretical problem in QKD consists in de-
termining how many key bits can be extracted securely
from a given protocol, i.e., determining a bound on the
key rate, particularly under realistic conditions such as
the presence of channel noise and imperfectly precise
sources and detectors. This is an incompletely solved
problem even for the original protocol proposed by Ben-
nett and Brassard [1], now commonly called the BB84
protocol. For instance, in the case of an otherwise ideal
implementation suffering from channel noise, and if the
key is extracted using one-way postprocessing, the BB84
protocol has been shown to be secure asymptotically if
the error rate is less than the Shor-Preskill error rate
of 11% [4], but has only been proved insecure if the er-
ror rate exceeds around 14.64% [5]. Kraus et al. found
that the lower threshold error rate could be increased to
around 12.41% by local randomisation, in which one of
the legitimate parties randomly flips a fraction of their
raw key bits as a preprocessing step [6, 7]; Smith et al.
subsequently increased this threshold to 12.92% using
block codes [8]. If two-way postprocessing is used, the
threshold error rate is known to lie between 20% and
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25% [9, 10]. More recently, local randomisation has been
investigated for the BB84 protocol in the case of finite
statistics [11].
Parallel to this, substantial effort has gone toward
adapting security proofs for the BB84 protocol to ac-
count for device imprecisions, as described for instance in
Refs. [12–18], where the goal is to derive a key-rate bound
in a setting where either the source or measurement basis
states or both are allowed to deviate from the σz and σx
eigenstates ideally required by the BB84 protocol. Typic-
ally, the result is a generalisation of the Shor-Preskill key
rate depending on additional parameters characterising
the quantum devices, and the improvement obtainable
with preprocessing is not investigated.
In this article, an approach to accounting for source im-
precisions for the BB84 protocol, described in Ref. [18],
is extended to include the local randomisation prepro-
cessing procedure described in [6, 7]. The approach is
based on the security framework by Devetak and Winter
[19] and can be used to derive bounds on the asymptotic
key rate secure against an adversary restricted to col-
lective attacks [20]. Conceptually, it separates into two
steps: first, a lower bound on the Devetak-Winter key
rate is derived in terms of an adversary’s ability to dis-
tinguish their marginals of the z-basis states, as meas-
ured by the fidelity; second, the fidelity itself is lower
bounded in terms of the observed error rate (such a
bound can be viewed as quantifying the measurement-
disturbance tradeoff or the limits on state cloning im-
posed by quantum physics). The incorporation of local
randomisation presented here concerns only the first of
these steps and is achieved by a straightforward gener-
alisation of the intermediate bound on the key rate in
terms of the fidelity derived in [18]. The approach can
therefore automatically apply to any BB84-like protocol
for which a fidelity bound of the type derived in [18] is
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2known or can be derived.
Following this adaptation, particular attention is given
to a nonideal BB84 implementation in which one party
(Alice) has a source transmitting four characterised but
arbitrary pure states and the second party (Bob)’s meas-
urements are uncharacterised. The relative improvement
obtained with the additional preprocessing is found to be-
come more significant in the case of an imperfect source.
Finally, the bound obtained on the Devetak-Winter rate,
both with and without the additional preprocessing, is
shown to be tight; this is demonstrated by the explicit
construction of a family of sources and optimal collect-
ive attacks for which the Devetak-Winter rate is attained
with equality.
As mentioned above, the security results derived here
assume an adversary restricted to collective attacks. In
Appendix A, we outline how the (prepare-and-measure)
BB84 protocol considered here could be recast in an
equivalent entanglement-based form, for which security
against collective attacks is already known to imply se-
curity against general attacks under the assumption of a
dimension bound on the Hilbert space.
II. GENERAL SCENARIO AND METHOD
The following generic setting is considered: one party
(Alice) possesses a source capable of emitting one of a
number of quantum states and transmitting them over
an untrusted quantum channel to a second party (Bob),
who performs measurements on them. Two of the states,
which we will call the “z-basis” states (even if they are
not orthogonal) and denote by |α〉 and |α′〉, are intended
for key generation. These should be selected (equiprob-
ably between them) by Alice and transmitted to Bob the
majority of the time. The remaining states are intended
for the purpose of characterising the quantum channel
and testing for the presence of an eavesdropper. One of
Bob’s possible measurements (a “z-basis” measurement)
should be used a majority of the time and should ideally
be calibrated in such a way that the measurement out-
come is maximally correlated with Alice’s choice of z-
basis state. After all the quantum states have been trans-
mitted, Alice and Bob publicly reveal in which cases they
each used the z-basis states and measurement. A subset
of the results are sacrificed in order to estimate the z-
basis error rate, which we denote by δz, after which they
are discarded. The cases where at least one of Alice or
Bob did not use the z basis are used to estimate one
or more parameters, which we collectively denote ω, de-
pending on the specific details of the protocol. Alice then
flips a fraction η of her z-basis key bits, publicly reveal-
ing η but not which bits she flips. Finally, Alice and Bob
extract a key using one-way error correction and privacy
amplification, as usual.
We assume that an adversary attacks the quantum
channel unitarily, individually, identically, in which case
they acquire partial traces ρE = TrB[|α〉〈α|] or ρ′E =
TrB[|α′〉〈α′|] of the z-basis states transmitted by Alice,
and that they are allowed to delay their measurements
indefinitely. In this case, a lower bound on the extract-
able secret key rate by one-way postprocessing is given
by the Devetak-Winter rate [19], which we express as
r = H(Z | E)−H(Z | Z ′) . (1)
In (1), H(Z | Z ′) denotes the classical (Shannon) entropy
of Alice’s version of the key conditioned on Bob’s z-basis
measurement outcome and quantifies the key lost by error
correction. In the typical case of symmetric errors, H(Z |
Z ′) = h(δ˜z), where δ˜z = (1− η)δz + η(1− δz) is the error
rate between Alice and Bob’s z-basis results (after Alice
has flipped a fraction η of her bits), h(p) = −p log(p) −
(1 − p) log(1 − p) is the binary entropy, and throughout
this article, log is the base-2 logarithm.
H(Z | E) denotes the von Neumann entropy of Alice’s
key bits conditioned on the adversary’s quantum side in-
formation, formally evaluated on the classical-quantum
state
τZE =
1
2
(
(1− η)|0〉〈0|Z + η|1〉〈1|Z
)⊗ ρE
+ 12
(
η|0〉〈0|Z + (1− η)|1〉〈1|Z
)⊗ ρ′E . (2)
In this framework, the main objective is to obtain a
lower bound on H(Z | E) in terms of the parameters
ω observed by Alice and Bob. Following the approach
in [18], this can be separated into two steps. We first
derive a lower bound on H(Z | E) in terms of the fidel-
ity F (ρE, ρ
′
E) = ‖
√
ρE
√
ρ′E‖1 of the adversary’s marginal
z-basis states. This can then be complemented by a suit-
able bound F (ρE, ρ
′
E) ≥ F (ω) on the fidelity itself. Such
a bound will generally depend on the details of the spe-
cific protocol being considered and assumptions about
the source states and/or Bob’s measurements. For ex-
ample, for an ideal BB84 implementation with no local
randomisation, the Shor-Preskill key rate is recovered
by combining H(Z | E) ≥ 1 − h( 12 + 12F (ρE, ρ′E)) with
F (ρE, ρ
′
E) ≥ |1 − 2δx|, where δx is the x-basis error rate
[18].
In order to derive a lower bound on H(Z | E), we first
reexpress the classical-quantum state (2) as
τZE =
1
2 |0〉〈0|Z ⊗ ρ˜E + 12 |1〉〈1|Z ⊗ ρ˜′E , (3)
where ρ˜E = TrB[ρ˜] and ρ˜
′
E = TrB[ρ˜
′], and we have set
ρ˜ = (1− η)ρ + ηρ′ , (4)
ρ˜′ = ηρ + (1− η)ρ′ , (5)
where ρ = |α〉〈α| and ρ′ = |α′〉〈α′| are the two z-basis
states. The conditional von Neumann entropy, evaluated
directly on the classical-quantum state (3), simplifies to
H(Z | E) = 1+ 12
(
S(ρ˜E)+S(ρ˜
′
E)
)−S( 12 (ρE +ρ′E)) , (6)
with S(ρ) = −Tr[ρ log(ρ)]. Following the approach in
[18], we use that H(Z | E) ≥ H(Z | EE′) for any ex-
tension τZEE′ of the state (3) to a larger Hilbert space
3in order to replace ρE and ρ
′
E with purifications |ψ〉 and
|ψ′〉 chosen such that F (ρE, ρ′E) = 〈ψ|ψ′〉. With this sub-
stitution,
H(Z | E) ≥ 1 + 12S
(
(1− η)|ψ〉〈ψ|+ η|ψ′〉〈ψ′|)
+ 12S
(
η|ψ〉〈ψ|+ (1− η)|ψ′〉〈ψ′|)
− S( 12 (|ψ〉〈ψ|+ |ψ′〉〈ψ′|)) . (7)
The eigenvalues of the operator (1− η)|ψ〉〈ψ|+ η|ψ′〉〈ψ′|
are easily found to be 12± 12
√
1− 4η(1− η)(1− |〈ψ|ψ′〉|2).
Consequently,
H(Z | E) ≥ 1− h( 12 + 12F (ρE, ρ′E))
+ h
(
1
2 +
1
2
√
1− 4η(1− η)(1− F (ρE, ρ′E)2)) . (8)
In Appendix B, the right-hand side of (8) is shown to
be an increasing function of the fidelity. Given a lower
bound F (ρE, ρ
′
E) ≥ F (ω) on the fidelity, then, we obtain
the analytic lower bound
r ≥ 1 + h
(
1
2 +
1
2
√
1− 4η(1− η)(1− F (ω)2))
− h( 12 + 12F (ω))− h((1− η)δz + η(1− δz)) (9)
for the key rate.
The best result for the key rate is obtained by max-
imising the right-hand side of (9) over η, which, if ne-
cessary, is readily done numerically. Typically, as the
channel noise approaches the maximal threshold, the op-
timal fraction η approaches 1/2. In this regime, the beha-
viour of the key-rate bound can be studied by substitut-
ing η = (1− ε)/2 and expanding the resulting expression
in powers of ε. The result, to the first non-trivial order
in ε, is
r &
(
−1− F (ω)
2
4F (ω)
log
(
1 + F (ω)
1− F (ω)
)
+
(1− 2δz)2
2 ln(2)
)
ε2 ,
(10)
where ln is the natural logarithm. Consequently,
threshold error rates can be obtained by identifying cor-
responding roots of the expression(
1− F (ω)2) ln(1 + F (ω)
1− F (ω)
)
− 2F (ω)(1− 2δz)2 . (11)
III. RESULT FOR NONIDEAL BB84
The technique described in the preceding section can,
in principle, be applied to any BB84-like protocol for
which a bound of the form F (ρE, ρ
′
E) ≥ F (ω) for the fi-
delity is known or can be derived. In this section, we illus-
trate its application to a nonideal prepare-and-measure
BB84 implementation, in which Alice’s source emits four
arbitrary but characterised pure states and Bob performs
uncharacterised measurements, for which a suitable fidel-
ity bound is already given in [18]. In this setting, Alice’s
source emits two states, which we call the “x-basis” states
and denote |β〉 and |β′〉, and Bob performs an “x-basis”
measurement, in addition to the z-basis states |α〉 and
|α′〉 and z-basis measurement previously described. (We
adopt this nomenclature even if the source states and
measurements do not satisfy the ideal BB84 relations.)
We assume Alice’s source is characterised by an angular
parameter θ, defined in terms of the source states by√
1 + |sin(θ)| = 12
∣∣〈α|β〉+〈α′|β〉+〈α|β′〉−〈α′|β′〉∣∣ , (12)
wherever the right-hand side of (12) is greater than 1.
Given this characterisation, the fidelity between Eve’s
marginals of the z states is lower bounded by
F (ρE, ρ
′
E) ≥ |sin(θ)|D(σB, σ′B)
− |cos(θ)|
√
1−D(σB, σ′B)2 , (13)
where σB = TrE[|β〉〈β|], σ′B = TrrE [|β′〉〈β′|], and
D(σB, σ
′
B) =
1
2‖σB − σ′B‖1 is the trace distance between
Bob’s marginals of the x states [18]. The trace distance
itself is lower bounded by D(σB, σ
′
B) ≥ |1− 2δx| in terms
of the x-basis error rate, regardless of how Bob’s measure-
ment apparatus is oriented. Explicitly combining these
with the generic key-rate expression (9), we obtain the
bound
r ≥ 1 + h
(
1
2 +
1
2
√
1− 4η(1− η)(1− fθ(|1− 2δx|)2))
− h( 12 + 12fθ(|1− 2δx|))− h(δ˜z) , (14)
with δ˜z = (1− η)δz + η(1− δz) and fθ defined by
fθ(x) =
{
|sin(θ)|x− |cos(θ)|√1− x2 : x ≥ |cos(θ)|
0 : x ≤ |cos(θ)| ,
(15)
for the key rate with local randomisation applied. For
η = 0, we recover the key rate
r ≥ 1− h( 12 + 12fθ(|1− 2δx|))− h(δz) (16)
given in [18], which itself coincides with the rate derived
in [15] in the setting under consideration here.
The rates (14) and (16) (with and without local ran-
domisation, respectively) are illustrated for a few values
of θ in Fig. 1, assuming symmetric errors (i.e., δz = δx =
δ) for simplicity. The depicted rates with local random-
isation were found by numerically maximising (14) over
η. For θ = pi/2 = 90◦, corresponding to an ideal BB84
source, we recover the Shor-Preskill rate [4] and the im-
provement with local randomisation depicted in Fig. 2 of
Ref. [7].
The threshold error rates, i.e., the error rates for
which the key rates (16) without preprocessing and (14)
with optimal local randomisation become zero, again for
δz = δx = δ, are depicted in Fig. 2 as a function of
θ. The threshold curve with local randomisation was
found by identifying the corresponding root of (11). For
θ = pi/2 = 90◦ we recover the threshold error rates of
490◦80◦70◦
δ
r
0 0.1
1
Figure 1. Key rates for θ = 90◦, θ = 80◦, and θ = 70◦ with
(dashed curves) and without (solid curves) local randomisa-
tion, for δ = δz = δx.
θ
δ
0 90◦
0.1
Figure 2. Threshold error rate with (dashed curve) and
without (solid curve) local randomisation, for 0 ≤ θ ≤ 90◦.
δ ≈ 12.4120% and δ ≈ 11.0028% originally found in
Refs. [6] and [4], respectively. For an ideal BB84 im-
plementation, this corresponds to a relative increase of
around 12.81% to the provably tolerable channel noise.
This difference becomes more significant as θ decreases:
for instance the relative improvement becomes around
20.00% (δ ≈ 7.5191% compared with δ ≈ 6.2660%) for
θ = 70◦, around 33.84% (δ ≈ 3.1120% vs δ ≈ 2.3251%)
for θ = 45◦, and around 83.38% (δ ≈ 0.1538% vs
δ ≈ 0.08390%) if θ is as low as 10◦, indicating that the
benefit of additional preprocessing becomes more pro-
nounced for a realistic BB84 implementation expected to
suffer from device imprecisions.
IV. OPTIMALITY OF KEY-RATE BOUND
For the nonideal BB84 implementation considered in
the preceding section, the key-rate bound (14) is tight
in the sense that the Devetak-Winter rate (1) can be at-
tained for all values of the independent variables θ, δz,
δx, and η. This is demonstrated here by the explicit con-
struction of a family of source states and optimal unit-
ary attacks. Equality between the right-hand sides of (1)
and (14) requires the conditional von Neumann entropy
bound (8) and the fidelity bound (13) to hold with equal-
ity simultaneously, which helps in the determination of
an optimal attack. First, note that in the case of an
equality, (13) rearranges to
|sin(θ)| = FZDX +
√
1− F 2Z
√
1−D 2X , (17)
with FZ = F (ρE, ρ
′
E) and DX = D(σB, σ
′
B) and the con-
dition FZ ≤ DX . Equation (17) can equivalently be re-
expressed as√
1 + |sin(θ)| = 1√
2
(√
1 + FZ
√
1 +DX
+
√
1− FZ
√
1−DX
)
. (18)
Consequently, our goal will be to construct source states
such that the definition of the source characterisation
(12) equals the right-hand side of (18).
Requiring D(ρB, ρ
′
B) = DZ suggests setting the z-basis
states to the form
|α〉 =
√
1+DZ
2 |0〉B|ψ0〉E +
√
1−DZ
2 |1〉B|ψ′1〉E , (19)
|α′〉 =
√
1−DZ
2 |0〉B|ψ1〉E +
√
1+DZ
2 |1〉B|ψ′0〉E , (20)
with |0〉B and |1〉B orthonormal. The trace distance
D(ρB, ρ
′
B) will equal DZ if 〈ψ0|ψ′1〉 = 〈ψ1|ψ′0〉 = 0. In
order for the fidelity F (ρE, ρ
′
E) to equal FZ , and in such
a way that the von Neumann entropy bound (8) be-
comes an equality, we additionally require 〈ψ0|ψ1〉 =
〈ψ′0|ψ′1〉 = 0 and 〈ψ0|ψ′0〉 = 〈ψ1|ψ′1〉 = FZ ∈ R+, such
that {|ψ0〉, |ψ′0〉} and {|ψ1〉, |ψ′1〉} span two mutually or-
thogonal subspaces. Note that, with these definitions,
|α〉 and |α′〉 are normalised and orthogonal.
The right-hand side of the source characterisation (12)
can be reexpressed as 1√
2
∣∣〈α+|β〉+ 〈α−|β′〉∣∣ with |α±〉 =
1√
2
(|α〉 ± |α′〉). Introducing, for convenience, the states
|αk〉 = |0〉B|ψk〉E , |α′k〉 = |1〉B|ψ′k〉E , (21)
and |α±k 〉 = 1√2
(|αk〉 ± |α′k〉), k ∈ {0, 1}, we find
|α+k 〉 =
√
1+FZ
2 |+〉B|ψ+k 〉E +
√
1−FZ
2 |−〉B|ψ−k 〉E ,(22)
|α−k 〉 =
√
1−FZ
2 |+〉B|ψ−k 〉E +
√
1+FZ
2 |−〉B|ψ+k 〉E ,(23)
where |±〉B = 1√2
(|0〉B + |1〉B) and the states
|ψ±k 〉E =
|ψk〉E ± |ψ′k〉E√
2± 2FZ
(24)
are orthonormal. In terms of |α±k 〉,
|α+〉 =
√
1+DZ
2 |α+0 〉+
√
1−DZ
2 |α+1 〉 , (25)
|α−〉 =
√
1+DZ
2 |α−0 〉 −
√
1−DZ
2 |α−1 〉 . (26)
5It is then fairly straightforward to construct x-basis
states for which the right-hand side of the source charac-
terisation (12) will take the form of the right-hand side
of (18). We set
|βk〉 =
√
1+DX
2 |+〉B|ψ+k 〉E +
√
1−DX
2 |−〉B|ψ−k 〉E ,(27)
|β′k〉 =
√
1−DX
2 |+〉B|ψ−k 〉E +
√
1+DX
2 |−〉B|ψ+k 〉E ,(28)
and
|β〉 =
√
1+DZ
2 |β0〉+
√
1−DZ
2 |β1〉 , (29)
|β′〉 =
√
1+DZ
2 |β′0〉 −
√
1−DZ
2 |β′1〉 . (30)
With these definitions we find
〈α+|β〉 = 〈α−|β′〉 = 1
2
(√
1 + FZ
√
1 +DX
+
√
1− FZ
√
1−DX
)
, (31)
independently of DZ , from which we recover the right-
hand side of the rearrangement (18) of the fidelity bound
(13).
Explicitly, from the expressions (19), (20), (29), and
(30) for the z- and x-basis states, Bob’s marginals are
given by
ρB =
1+DZ
2 |0〉〈0|B + 1−DZ2 |1〉〈1|B , (32)
ρ′B =
1−DZ
2 |0〉〈0|B + 1+DZ2 |1〉〈1|B , (33)
σB =
1+DX
2 |+〉〈+|B + 1−DX2 |−〉〈−|B , (34)
σ′B =
1−DX
2 |+〉〈+|B + 1+DX2 |−〉〈−|B . (35)
Consequently, Alice and Bob detect errors at the rates
δz =
1
2− 12DZ and δx = 12− 12DX if Bob measures (optim-
ally) in the σz and σx bases. Likewise, Eve’s marginals
of the z states are given by
ρE =
1+DZ
2 |ψ0〉〈ψ0|E + 1−DZ2 |ψ′1〉〈ψ′1|E , (36)
ρ′E =
1−DZ
2 |ψ1〉〈ψ1|E + 1+DZ2 |ψ′0〉〈ψ′0|E , (37)
for which one can readily verify that F (ρE, ρ
′
E) =
‖√ρE√ρ′E‖1 = FZ and, for any p, q ≥ 0 and p+ q = 1,
S
(
pρE + qρ
′
E
)
= h
(
1
2 +
1
2DZ
)
+ 1+DZ2 S
(
p|ψ0〉〈ψ0|E + q|ψ′0〉〈ψ′0|E
)
+ 1−DZ2 S
(
p|ψ′1〉〈ψ′1|E + q|ψ1〉〈ψ1|E
)
= h
(
1
2 +
1
2DZ
)
+ h
(
1
2 +
1
2
√
1− 4pq(1− F 2Z )
)
. (38)
Using (38) to directly evaluate the expression (6) for the
conditional von Neumann entropy H(Z | E), we find that
its bound (8) in terms of fidelity F (ρE, ρ
′
E) is attained
with equality for the entire family of sources and attacks
just constructed.
Equations (19), (20), (29), and (30) give the optimal
attack for a family of sources identified by the relations
〈α|α′〉 = 〈β|β′〉 = 0 (39)
and
〈α|β〉 = 〈α′|β〉 = 〈α|β′〉 = −〈α′|β′〉 =
√
1+|sin(θ)|
2 , (40)
for which the bound (14) on the Devetak-Winter rate is
attained with equality independently of the fraction η
of bits flipped by Alice in the local randomisation pre-
processing step. The family of optimal attacks given
here generalises the optimal individual attack derived
for an ideal BB84 source in [5], which is recovered for
|sin(θ)| = 1 or, equivalently, by setting FZ = DX . An-
other extreme worth noting is the case FZ = 0 and
DZ = DX = 1, in which case |sin(θ)| = 0 and
|α〉 = |0〉B|0〉E , |α′〉 = |1〉B|1〉E , (41)
|β〉 = |+〉B|+〉E , |β′〉 = |−〉B|+〉E , (42)
i.e., the adversary acquires perfect copies of Bob’s z-basis
states without introducing any errors.
V. CONCLUSION
This article described how the local randomisation pre-
processing technique proposed by Kraus et al. in [6, 7]
can be incorporated into the security analysis introduced
in [18] for the BB84 protocol. The improvement to the
key rate and tolerable channel noise was explicitly quan-
tified for an imperfect BB84 implementation in which
Alice’s source emits four arbitrary but characterised pure
states and Bob’s measurements are left largely unchar-
acterised. The improvement becomes more significant if
the source is imperfect. The asymptotic key-rate bound
(14) was shown to be tight given the source character-
isation parameter θ defined in (12), and is attained for
the family of source states and optimal collective attacks
constructed in Sec. IV if Bob performs the ideal σz and
σx measurements.
The setting described in Sec. II was left somewhat gen-
eric as the method is not necessarily limited to just the
BB84 protocol itself. In particular it has already been
found to apply to a semi-device-independent QKD pro-
tocol in which Alice’s source and Bob’s measurements are
assumed two dimensional [21]. The device-independent
protocol studied in [22] may also be a candidate; this is
suggested by the fact that the conditional von Neumann
entropy bound (8) is attained with equality for the op-
timal collective attack derived in [22].
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Appendix A: Equivalent entanglement-based
protocol
The main problem addressed in this article is the deriv-
ation of key rates for variants of the prepare-and-measure
BB84 protocol secure against an adversary limited to col-
lective attacks. In the case of entanglement-based QKD,
security against collective attacks is known to imply se-
curity against general attacks in the asymptotic limit,
at least under the assumption of a dimension bound,
the assumption that Alice’s and Bob’s measurements are
memoryless, and if a symmetrisation procedure is applied
[23]. In this section, we briefly review how the BB84 pro-
tocol considered in Sec. III could be recast in the form of
an equivalent entanglement-based protocol.
The starting point, already considered by the authors
of [13–15], is that Alice could prepare the four source
states by equivalently preparing and distributing an en-
tangled “coin” state of the form
|Ψ〉ABE = c00|00〉A|α〉BE + c01|01〉A|α′〉BE
+ c10|10〉A|β〉BE + c11|11〉A|β′〉BE (A1)
and determining her bit and basis choice by measuring
in the (orthonormal) {|00〉A, |01〉A, |10〉A, |11〉A} basis. In
(A1), the coefficients cij , i, j ∈ {0, 1} determine the prob-
ability of Alice selecting a particular bit and basis and
can always be taken to be real and nonnegative. In the
setting considered in Sec. III, Alice uses the z basis the
majority of the time and chooses between the two states
in each basis equiprobably. For the amplitudes cij , this
translates to
c00 = c01 =
√
1− ε
2
, (A2)
c10 = c11 =
√
ε
2
(A3)
for some given ε close to zero. The states
|α〉, |α′〉, |β〉, |β′〉 ∈ HB⊗HE shared by Bob and Eve cor-
respond to the z- and x-basis states and the relations
between them are fully specified, such that (A1) is de-
termined up to an overall unitary on HB ⊗HE.
The virtual protocol described so far is not a secure
entanglement-based protocol in the usual sense, as it re-
quires Alice and Bob to trust that the shared entangled
state is of the form given in (A1). To remove this, note
that it is equivalent for Alice to know the marginal dens-
ity operator ρA = TrBE
[|Ψ〉〈Ψ|ABE], as all purifications
of ρA are related by unitaries on HB⊗HE. Specifically, if
|Ψ〉ABE is any purification of ρA, the z and x states and
amplitutes appearing in (A1) can be recovered by
c00|α〉BE = (〈00|A ⊗ 1BE)|Ψ〉ABE , (A4)
c01|α′〉BE = (〈01|A ⊗ 1BE)|Ψ〉ABE , (A5)
c10|β〉BE = (〈10|A ⊗ 1BE)|Ψ〉ABE , (A6)
c11|β′〉BE = (〈11|A ⊗ 1BE)|Ψ〉ABE . (A7)
Since ρA is reconstructable by tomography, Alice no
longer needs to trust that the entangled state is of the
form (A1), provided that she performs additional tomo-
graphic measurements to determine or verify that ρA
is of a particular desired form as part of the virtual
entanglement-based protocol outlined here.
Appendix B: Convexity of conditional entropy
bound
The right-hand side of (8) has the form
H(F ) = 1 + φ(R)− φ(F ) , (B1)
where, for convenience, we have set
R =
√
λ+ µF 2 , (B2)
λ = (1− 2η)2 and µ = 4η(1− η) (such that 0 ≤ λ, µ ≤ 1
and λ+ µ = 1), and the function φ is defined by
φ(x) = h( 12 +
1
2x)
= 1− 12 (1 + x) log(1 + x)
− 12 (1− x) log(1− x) (B3)
for −1 < x < 1 and φ(1) = φ(−1) = 0.
If µ = 1 (and λ = 0), (B1) reduces to H(F ) = 1. In the
following we show that, for µ < 1, H is a convex function
by showing that its second derivative in F is nonnegative.
Since its global minimum is H(0) = 0, it will follow that
H is an increasing function over the range 0 ≤ F ≤ 1.
We first evaluate the first and second derivatives of φ;
respectively, they are
φ′(x) = − 12 log
(1 + x
1− x
)
(B4)
and
φ′′(x) = − 1
ln(2)
1
1− x2 . (B5)
For the first and second derivatives of R (viewed as a
function of F ), we obtain R′ = µF/R and R′′ = λµ/R3.
In terms of φ and its derivatives and R, the first and
second derivatives of H are
H ′(F ) = φ′(R)
µF
R
− φ′(F ) , (B6)
and
H ′′(F ) = φ′′(R)
µ2F 2
R2
+ φ′(R)
λµ
R3
− φ′′(F ) . (B7)
7Using that φ′′(F ) = µφ′′(R) and that µF 2−R2 = µ−1 =
−λ, (B7) can be rearranged to
H ′′(F ) =
λµ
R3
(
−Rφ′′(R) + φ′(R)
)
=
1
ln(2)
λµ
R3
[
R
1−R2 −
1
2 ln
(
1 +R
1−R
)]
=
1
4 ln(2)
λµ
R3
(
Z − 1
Z
− 2 ln(Z)
)
, (B8)
where we set Z = (1 +R)/(1−R) and we used that
4R
1−R2 =
(1 +R)2 − (1−R)2
(1 +R)(1−R) = Z −
1
Z
. (B9)
Finally, we note that (λµ)/(4 ln(2)R3) ≥ 0 and that, for
Z ≥ 1,
Z − 1
Z
− 2 ln(Z) =
∫ Z
1
dz
(
1 +
1
z2
)
− 2
∫ Z
1
dz
1
z
=
∫ Z
1
dz
(
1− 1
z
)2
≥ 0 , (B10)
which together imply H ′′(F ) ≥ 0.
From (B6), we see that H ′(0) = 0, confirming that F =
0 is at least a local extremum. Since H is convex, the only
possibility is that F = 0 is, in fact, the global minimum,
in turn implying that H is an increasing function of F
over the range 0 ≤ F ≤ 1.
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